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Abstract
Statistical analysis of toolmarks using frequentist methods can be problematic for assorted
reasons.Thus, in order to analyze toolmarks whilst avoiding these issues, a Bayesian approach is
taken. Specifically for this thesis we discuss the computation of a specific Likelihood Ratio for
toolmark comparisons.

This Bayesian based approach involves using data already at hand in conjunction with a
probability model in order to establish an estimate for its “value”, i.e. the “weight of evidence”.
Making the calculations to obtain a Likelihood Ratio is very cumbersome and time consuming.
Also many commercial software packages hide the process and underlying assumptions that go
into its calculation. Using the open-source software called "R", we developed a package that,
after the toolmark data is entered, a Likelihood Ratio for it is estimated. Ideally, using opensource software and having the code publicly available, collaboration on refining the overall
estimation process can start and hopefully reach consensus.

Statistics in Forensic Science
The use of statistics in forensic science, that is the application of statistics to evidence,
has received a lot of attention to determine the validity of assigning error rates to some evidence
types. The product of forensic statistical analysis is a probability, an example being the chance of
finding another random match, but the process of making a calculation varies based on the type
of evidence. For example, the processes for calculating the Likelihood Ratio (LR) for DNA and
tool marks are different. While the foundation of the calculation is fundamentally the same, the
process in order to perform the calculation is very different.
Background of Bayesian Statistics
There is a push for other types of evidence to meet the standards set by DNA. Statistical
analyses for DNA evidence, considered the gold standard, has evolved tremendously with time.
The most common type of statistics is the frequentist method, which is the determination of the
frequency of a given observation over the number repetitions of an experiment. To exemplify
how experimental data determines frequency consider Equation 1.

Frequency of observation of interest =

𝑛𝑖
𝑁

(Equation 1)

Equation 1 represents the frequency of an observation of interest being equal to the ratio of the
number of times the observation of interest is the result over the total number observations. The
observation of interest is denoted by the term “ni” and total number of observations is denoted
by the term “N”. The classic example for Equation 1 is the flipping of a coin which has two
possible outcomes “heads” or “tails”, where if the observation of interest is “heads” and that is
observed 10 times over the course of 20 experiments, then the frequency of “heads” is 10/20 or
1/2. However, in the frequentist method as the number of total observation approaches infinity,
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the frequency of the observation of interest becomes probability. This change in terms is due to
the ability to infer the results of the given experiment’s sample size to the population, which is
that as “N” approaches infinity the frequency of the observation of interest can be inferred upon
the total population. The population being representative of all experiments of that nature, for the
above example, a coin toss. So if the above frequency of ½ is maintained as the number of total
observations approaches infinity, then it can be said that the probability of the all coin tosses is
½. The frequentist method can be applied to evidence in forensic science because an observation
of interest can be established, such as a particular DNA profile, fingerprint, or tool mark pattern.
The observation of evidence can then be divided by the total observations made, but there are
two problems. The first is that statistical analysis for evidence is not that simple since there are
many variables that can affect the outcome. For instance, DNA can have mutations where a
direct match would yield a false negative, or in tool marks the tool can change from wear over
time producing a different pattern. Second, in order to use the frequentist method a dataset or
database large enough to be able to infer upon the population is needed. This limitation is where
most types of evidence suffer since there are not standardized methods on collection of data.
Attempting to calculate the probability for evidence using a frequentist method can become
problematic, so a different type of statistical method can be used to account for these variables.
Another type of statistics is called Bayesian statistics, which is a type of statistics which
deals with how to represent evidence about the true state of the world and express it in terms of
degrees of belief. (Bolstad, 2007) Where degree of belief is measured on a scale between 0 and
1. An adherent of Bayesian statistics uses the words “degree of belief” and “probability”
interchangeably. This interchangeability of terms is due to a Bayesian’s belief being an
interpretation of probability. However, a Bayesian’s belief like the frequentist’s frequency can be
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updated with data. Data is the acquisition of knowledge, so that the belief fits with the true state
of the world. To clarify, Bayesian statistics runs parallel with frequentist statistics in the sense
that with data, a belief or frequency can possibly bias or alter the notions for future experiments.
Expanding on the coin toss experiment mentioned before. Before any data is collected, with the
assumption that the coin is totally fair, that is no observable or measureable differences to bias
the outcome, both frequentist and Bayesian methods could assume that either side has a ½
chance. Now if 20 experiments were run and the results yielded 15 “heads”, the frequency would
be 15/20, while Bayesian would say that “heads” is believed to be more likely to occur than
“tails.” The results can therefore bias future predictions but this could be attributed to a very
small sample size. Now take the results of “heads” and “tails” and assign the terms “match” and
“non-match” respectively. If a known tool mark pattern is compared to an unknown pattern it
should be either a “match” or a “non-match.” However, this is not always the case due to
possible changes in the tool over time as it was used and wore down. This creates a grey area,
which is something that cannot be explained by simple frequentist methods. Instead, Bayesian
statistics offers the advantage of offering a way to calculate the probability, or belief, that the
unknown tool mark came from the known tool. The confidence that the known tool, or known
evidence, was the source of the unknown tool mark, or unknown evidence, can be represented
by:

(Bayes’

Theorem)
(Zheng, 2008)
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The above equation, known as Bayes’ theorem, is an equation used to demonstrate the
confidence in the evidence. Bayes’ theorem is read the Probability of guilt given the evidence is
equal to the probability of the evidence given guilt multiplied by the probability of guilt, all over
the sum of the probability of the evidence given guilt multiplied by the probability of guilt and
the probability of the evidence given not guilty multiplied by the probability of not guilty.
Simply put, Bayes’ theorem offers a way to calculate the probability of guilt by determining a
factor of how well the evidence supports one side versus the other. So the calculated factor
would be able to show how the evidence supports the prosecutor or defense. One advantage of
the Bayes’ theorem is that it accounts for subtle differences in the evidence that could have
otherwise yielded a non-match or false negative.
Building upon the Bayes’ theorem, there are two sides of every court case, the
prosecution and the defense.
The prosecutor’s hypothesis is represented by “Hp”, while the defense’s hypothesis is
“Hd”. Using the evidence, denoted by “E”, and any additional background information, denoted
by “I”, the foundation for each side’s hypothesis is summed into an equation. Beginning with the
prosecution, the equation is as follows:

(Equation 2)
In Equation 2, the term “Ha” is the same as “Hp”. Equation 2 is read as the probability of the
prosecution’s hypothesis (“Ha”) given the evidence and background information is equivalent to
the probability of the evidence given the prosecution’s hypothesis and background information
divided by the probability of evidence all multiplied by the probability of the prosecution’s
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hypothesis with background information. On the other hand, the equation that represents the
defense is similar and is as follows:

(Equation 3)
The term, in Equation 3, “Hb” is the same as “Hd”, and is read in a similar fashion to that
explained with Equation 2, but substituting the prosecution’s hypothesis with the defense’s
hypothesis. Both Equations 2 and 3 are used to represent the logical approach that would be
taken to explain how the evidence would support the different hypotheses.
With the foundation of both sides, the equations are used to form the Bayes’ Theorem in
Odd’s form, where equation 2 is divided by equation 3. For the complete steps of this division
refer to Appendix I-Derivation of Odd’s Form. Following simple arithmetic the division of
Equation 2 with Equation 3, yields the following:

(Odd’s Form)
In the Odd’s form of Bayes’ Theorem, both sides’ hypotheses are directly compared to
one another via a ratio. The Odd’s form has three terms. The contents to the left of the equal sign
are known as the posterior odds, while the contents right of the equal sign are broken down into
two terms, labeled in the above equation, Likelihood Ratio and Prior Odds. From left to right of
the Odd’s Form equation, the first term is known as the posterior odds, in this case in favor of
those for “Ha”. Then there is the likelihood ratio and finally the prior odds in favor of “Ha”. The
Odd’s form is interpreted as the weight of evidence in favor of the prosecutions hypothesis
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multiplied by the prior odds in favor of the prosecution’s hypothesis. The prior odds serve as
prior knowledge and when updated with data, knowledge, they become posterior odds. The idea
behind this is that the Bayesian approach allows for beliefs (i.e. prior knowledge) to be updated
with subsequent experiments. The posterior odds from the previous experiment become the prior
odds of the subsequent experiment. Following the frequentist method, if infinite amount of
experiments were able to be performed then theoretically the true state of the world for the
evidence would be obtained. Realistically, after a sufficient amount of experiments the true state
of the evidence should be obtained, but the number of experiments needed in order to obtain this
level of knowledge is debatable.
Likelihood Ratio and Scale Analysis
Referring to the Odd’s Form equation, the term of interest in forensic science is the
likelihood ratio which represents the weight of the evidence for one of the two hypotheses, the
prosecution or the defense. However, the interpretation of the numerical calculation of the
Likelihood Ratio varies. There is research that has been performed and scales have been made,
such as the Jeffrey’s Scale and Kass-Raftery Scale, which assign numerical brackets with a
verbal phrase to describe the amount of support the Likelihood Ratio has towards a particular
hypothesis (Jeffrey, 1998; Kass & Raftery, 1995). The scales range from 0 to infinity where
values between zero and one are in favor of the defense hypothesis, while numbers that are
greater than or equal to one are in support for the prosecution’s hypothesis.
There are several suggestions on how to interpret the calculated ratio. Many of said
suggestions have offered a scale where there is a numerical range for the likelihood ratio and a
verbal equivalent based on which range the likelihood ratio resides in (Aiken & Stoney, 1991;
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Jeffrey, 1998; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Ostrum, 2012). Refer to Appendix II: Likelihood Ratio
Scale, where the four scales to be analyzed have been placed. Looking at the four scales, both the
overall ranges, as well as each tier of certainty vary. For instance, the range of the Aitken and
Stoney (1991) scale goes from one to over a thousand. Numbers above 1000 fall into the final
category that is described to be “Very Strong”. Each level of the scale is described in one phrase
to simplify the evidential strength based on the calculated likelihood ratio. This contrasts to the
other three scales, especially to one mentioned by Ostrum (2012), where the overall range of the
scale is one to over a million. The scale presented by Ostrum follows a metric-like progression
with every level being an order of magnitude greater than the prior level. The other two scales
mentioned by Jeffrey (1998) and Kass & Raftery (1995), have a much smaller overall range
compared to afore mentioned scales with the overall range being 100 and 150 respectively. In
both Jeffrey’s and Kass & Rafterys’ scale, the ranges grow larger with each sequential level. For
example, looking at Jeffrey’s scale, the first range above one is only one to three, with the next
level encompassing three to ten, and afterwards 10 to 30. Each level after one grows in the size
of the values that are covered as well as assigning a verbal phrase equivalent to that range. The
diversity of the scales is obvious and arguably the assignment of ranges to verbal equivalent is
arbitrary, but this diversity in scales shows that there is no single agreement on how to interpret
the likelihood ratio.
With a lack of agreement within the community on how to interpret the Likelihood ratio,
there needs to be a movement to research and standardize the way that likelihood ratios are both
calculated and interpreted. An example of why this is important is if a LR calculation was made
and the number was 100, then there is a disagreement amongst the mentioned scales. While
Aitken and Stoney’s scale would say that 100 is “Fair” or “Good” support and Ostrum’s scale
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would say “moderate support”, Jeffrey’s scale and Kass-Raftery scale would say that 100 is “
very strongly in support” and “strongly supports”, respectively. The example value of 100 also
brings in another problem. One hundred falls on the cusp of two levels for three of the four
scales, which leads to question of which level would appropriately describe the support of the
calculated value. This point was raised in Aitken and Stoney (1991), where it’s mentioned that
the ranges in the table are not set in stone and values that would lie on the cusp, or verge, of
going to a higher level may be considered to do so. That brings into question about the accuracy
of these calculations, which was mentioned by Ostrum, where claiming 100% accuracy has been
frowned upon. So if a calculation is made and the LR is on the cusp of two levels on a scale,
should the higher or stronger support tier be allowed?
Referring to the work of Peter W. Huber, Galileo’s Revenge, a comparison is made
between hired guns and expert witnesses where the expert witness will overstep or embellish the
evidential value in order to make a stronger point. By allowing for a flexible structure within the
scale, then the value of evidence can be embellished, more so if the LR is on the cusp and
allowed to take on the verbal equivalent of the higher tier. One part of the problem is that the use
of LR in forensic science is relatively new. However, remember why Bayesian statistics is being
used in the first place. Without a database, or sufficiently large dataset, inference on the
population should not be done with a frequentist method, and many types of evidence currently
lack sufficient data to make frequentist methods a viable option. So while using the LR is an
alternative to a frequentist method, a database should be created, but as per the literature there
are two schools of thought in terms of what data is to be included in the database.
On one side, Aitken & Stoney (1991) says that the database should carefully be
constructed of data that has been rigorously tested so that the database does not become skewed
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by data that has been embellished, rigged, to favor a particular outcome. On the other side,
Ostrum, says that all data should be included into the database, where the impression is that bad
or skewed data will be filtered out over time. With both schools of thought, eventually with a
large enough database, frequentist methods may be used in order to validate the findings and
observations of the LR.
Potential LR Problems
There are some problems associated with the LR in its current state. Some of these
problems include the explanation of the calculation and results in court, as well as, the use of
programming, such as those mentioned in the literature. Starting with the explanation of the
calculation, up to this point the literature mentioned did not directly show a calculation for a LR,
but has talked about how the Bayes’ Theorem is expanded tremendously to accommodate all the
factors that apply to the evidence. Explaining all these steps to a judge, let alone a jury, might be
a problem since as per Ostrum, the rulings on the use of the LR have been inconsistent.
Furthermore, since the judge serves as a gatekeeper for the evidence that is permitted in court,
the explanation of the results using a simple phrase may be an oversimplification; how would a
jury know about which scale, which bracket, or which wording is the correct one to use? Aitkens
and Stoney (1991) mentioned that LR that are calculated to be much larger than their scale’s top
tier of support (>1000) should just be stated as numbers since LR of that magnitude cannot be
described in words. Even though there are arguments that the LR should be allowed into court,
the consequences for not thoroughly testing the use of LR include someone going to jail/prison
when they are innocent.
Considering that it was mentioned that the calculations for the LR can become quite
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cumbersome and time consuming, the use of computers may be a viable solution to help with the
calculation. The problem though would be to program a computer to offer such capabilities. In
Aitken’s and Stoney’s work, a program called Computer Assistance for Glass Evidence (CAGE)
is mentioned to be similar to a very powerful calculator. CAGE allows the user to input data and
do a calculation. If there was a previous examination of that data, the user can choose to
consider, use, or ignore the previous calculation. The choice the user makes seems arbitrary at
best since other elements pertaining to the calculation and software are not mentioned.
Algorithms
The tool marks that were used for this experiment were first acquired using the Zeiss CSM-700
Confocal Microscope with a 50x objective (Gambino C., et al, 2011; Petraco N. D. K., et al.
2013). An example striation pattern (and corresponding profile) appears in Figure 1a. The dark
sections are valleys or low points of the pattern, and the peaks are light/white areas of the
pattern. The striation pattern is converted to a line graph (i.e. a striation pattern mean profile),
Figure 1b, where the intensity of the peaks corresponds to striation pattern intensity of Figure 1a.
The lighter the area, the higher the peak, and the lower the area, the darker the peak. The
superimposed square wave shown in Figure 1b, intersects the line graph at half the distance
between each peak and valley. The major factor for the box wave is not the intensity of the peaks
or valleys, but rather the distance between them, which causes the width of the box waves to
change.
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The goal of this study is to examine a model which approximates true match probability
given a quantitative evidence representation (i.e. the complement of a random match probability)
and a prior probability for the true match. The process and steps of the algorithm is visually
represented in Appendix III-”Algorithm Flow Chart” parts one and two.
The data, consisting of 174 screwdrivers with a total of 1740 feature vectors, was divided
into thirds by random selection without replacement. The first third is used as a training set to
create the model. The remainder of the data was then randomly sampled into two equal data sets
where one portion would be used as a validation set for the model created. The final portion
represents a test set. Each third would undergo a simulation to generate more data so that within
the data set there was both real and simulated toolmarks (1A, 2A, 3A). After each third was
simulated, the data, both simulated and real, created a new set of data in their respective
categories (1B, 2B, 3B).
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Using the Biasotti-Murdock method, an algorithm, a numerical feature set for
comparisons between striated tool marks is constructed (Petraco, N. D. K., et al. 2017). A visual
representation of such a feature set for 1740 striation patterns from 58 different screwdriver
samples (29 actual screwdrivers, two sides each) appears above. Each row represents a vector of
scores where each line of a query profile is compared against a corresponding line of a
“reference” profile. This is shown visually; the better the score, the lighter the color. For this
instance, everything that appears yellow (lighter color in black/white) in Figure 2, that means
those lines have a high matching score. The figure was generated from query line comparisons
with 58 reference profiles. Typically the reference profiles are chosen from a large database and
represent the “closest matches” to a set of queries.
The feature vector (i.e. each row in Figure 2) is put through a machine learning

13

algorithm, trained to recognize a query based off its scores with respect to the reference set. The
trained learning algorithm is then tested on a feature set it was not trained with, producing an
error rate estimate.
The training set is first bootstrapped, that is sampled from with replacement, to create a
bootstrap set. With this bootstrap step, a support vector machine (SVM) is trained. Using the
now trained, or fitted, SVM, the original training set is then processed in order to obtain the Platt
scores (Figure 3). Then, the Platt scores of the tool marks that were used in the bootstrap set are
removed, which are represented in green in Figure 3. The remaining Platt scores are from tool
marks not used to fit the SVM, in red from Figure 3. A sample of Known Non-match (KNM)
scores are drawn and stored. The process is then repeated many thousands of times (typically
2000 times) to form a sample modeling the KNM distribution of Platt scores. For example, if
eight tools were not represented in the bootstrap set, then eight scores would be generated by the
SVM. Those eight scores would be separated from the remainder of the data, and labeled as the
null scores. From this set of eight scores, one would be randomly selected and a vector would be
created which contain all eight scores. The purpose behind making vectors of the null scores is to
make the KNM scores independent. The process of bootstrapping the training set, training a
SVM, and separating and processing the scores is repeated thousands of times, the typical
amount being 2000 times.
The above algorithm yields a bootstrap approximation of both the null (KNM) and nonnull (KM) distribution. Taking the log of the KNM scores produces a curve that often appears
bell-shaped, but is not quite Gaussian and may contain some skew. The data typically does
though so promise to fit a parametric form. Also, using a parametric distribution easily allows for
the computation of p-values need later in the algorithm. This a quantile-quantile (QQ) plot is
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generated to determine how the experimental quantile values compare to the fitted theoretical
quantile values for a choice of parametric distributions. The QQ plot is able to inform how
similar the distributions are and the visual inspection of the QQ plot is the primary diagnostic for
normality due to the plot being conservative. The purpose of the visual inspection of the QQ plot
is not to seek a perfect fit but to determine if the fitted model is a reasonable solution. Choices of
model this research have found useful are skewed-normal, normal-inverse-Gaussian, generalized
extreme value and Gaussian. Once a satisfactory model parametric distribution is fit, p-values of
a validation set of Platt-scores are computed and transformed to the z-domain via an inverse
probit function Φ-1(p). Secondary diagnostics are performed in order to check for normality.
Once a model is deemed to be a reasonable fit, the model is then labeled as the fit null
distribution.
The original training set is then used to train an SVM. Now the validation set is entered
into this SVM so that the KM scores are obtained as a result of this SVM. The resulting scores
that are obtained are for the known matching scores and are not necessarily a score which
represents the identification of the tool. However, in this example, the scores usually coincide
with the ID as all the tools being used are known. Assuming that the fit null distribution from
before was determined to be a reasonable fit, then an independent identical distribution (IID)
random sample is taken from the KNM distribution fit. This set of numbers that was randomly
sampled is then used to form a validation set. Randomly sampling the scores for the Efron fitting
procedure makes the more independent. At this step, if there the fit still does not look reasonable,
the experiment should stop and an evaluation should be conducted to check if the procedure has
been followed correctly. If not, the use of this method should be reconsidered.
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Now with the Efron fitting procedure being completed, the results are the posterior odds,
but as a byproduct of the calculation, the prior odds are also calculated. Recall Odd’s form and
the different terms which make up the equation. Since we have two of the three terms, prior and
the posterior odds, the only unknown is the Likelihood Ratio, which can be calculated easily by
dividing the posterior odds with the prior odds.

Results, Discussion and Theory
The figure of Platt scores below was generated from the trained SVM, where the values that are
green are Platt scores that were used in the bootstrap, while the red represents scores that were not used to
train the Platt scores.

Figure 3: Depiction of Platt score of KM and KNM

The task now is to convert these histograms into posterior probabilities for “matches” and “nonmatches” given their Platt score. Efron’s two-groups Empirical Bayes’ machinery can be adapted
to put a reasonable estimate on the level of belief that two patterns were generated from the same
source using these similarity scores. Below we give a brief overview of Efron’s approach (Efron
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B., 2010).
Let “Null” represent the belief that two patterns were not generated from the same source
(i.e. they do not “match”). Let “Non-null” represent the belief that two patterns were generated
from the same source (i.e. they “match”). The fitting process will require a training set. Call the
first set “known matches” (KM) and the second set “known non-matches” (KNM). For a given
training set representing a sample from a relevant population for which it is desired to identify at
least one unknown to a source, the number of KM (Non-null) and KNM (Null) scores
corresponding to the matching task can be calculated. Formulas for the number of KNM scores
depending on task version will be discussed in the results and discussion sections.
“Evidence” for a matching task will be represented as a score, z, which is related to the
similarity between the patterns under comparison. More specifically, z is obtained with a probit
transform of a p-value, p, with respect to the Null (non-match) distribution of a similarity score,
sm , output by an association algorithm

.

The p-value can be obtained by integration if a parametric form for the similarity score density,
p(sm | Null), is known or can be estimated,

or empirically if a parametric form for p(sm | Null) is not (or cannot) be specified

.
In the equations above, we are implicitly assuming that the distribution of similarity scores for
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“matches” lies to the right of the distribution of similarity scores for “non-matches” and thus we
are interested in right tail p-values with respect to the Null for sm. Note that the case could be
reversed. To handle that, drop the minus one in pint or flip the greater-than-or-equal-to sign in
pemp.
In practice, we prefer fitting a parametric distribution for p(sm | Null) to a set of known
non-match (Null) similarity scores, followed by integration to obtain the requisite p-values. The
reason is as follows: a “good” matching algorithm (which is what we want) will produce well
separated known non-match (KNM, Null) and known match (KM, Non-null) scores. In this case
the number of Null sm exceeding a Non-null sm will be very small, and in fact usually = 0. This
leads to many 0 p-values for KM sm scores, and thus many (negative) infinite KM z-values. In
reality, z-values corresponding to KM sm scores for a “good” matching algorithm should be large
in magnitude, but not infinite.
Once a set of similarity scores has been obtained for a matching task, Efron’s two-groups
model can be put together from the following probabilities and probability densities over their
corresponding z-scores. The likelihoods of the scores under the Null/Non-null hypotheses are

and
.
Note that the Null density is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation 0. In theory
0

= 0 and 0 = 1. In practice they are estimated and typically close to those values.
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The prior probabilities of either hypothesis are denoted

and
.
The local false discovery rate parameter is defined as

which is just the posterior probability that items of evidence are not from the same source given
their z-score. It is a simple application of Bayes’ theorem. The complement of fdr(z) is the local
true discovery rate (tdr(z)), or the probability that items of evidence are from the same source
given their z-score (i.e. their “posterior match probability”)
.
The computational task at hand is to find a reasonable estimate for fdr(z) (after which, tdr(z) can
be found) from data. Using data to estimate all the pieces of Bayes’ theorem is known as the
field of empirical Bayes’ estimation.
Denote the denominator of Bayes’ theorem as
.
Efron has shown how estimation of f(z) also yields estimates of f0(z) and 0. The estimation of f(z)
can be carried by first discretizing N total z-scores into K intervals of width (Lindsey, J., 1974a;
Lindsey, J., 1974b; Efron B., 2010]. The mean number z-scores falling into interval k is
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approximately

where xk is the center of interval k. Modeling the number of z-scores in bin k as a Poisson
random variable

the log mean can be expanded with d degrees of freedom in a natural cubic spline basis [hi(xk)]

or a polynomial basis [(xk)i]

.
Efron prescribes maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) for the regression coefficients i and
their standard errors (Efron, B., 2010). The R package locfdr can be used to carry out this task.
Hierarchical Bayesian Poisson (HBP) regression can also be used for the estimation process.
Over-dispersion terms are easy to include in the Bayesian based regression if correlation is
suspected in the underlying z-scores. If there is significant correlation between the z-scores,
accounting for over-dispersion in the regression process can help to obtain more realistic
estimates for standard errors, and thus fdr(z) and tdr(z) point estimate uncertainty (Gelman A., et
al., 2013;Gelman A. & Hill., 2006).
HBP is the process used to estimate f(z). The directed acyclic graph representation of the
joint probability density fit is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Acyclic Graph showing steps of determining a model for Poisson Regression
In Figure 4, shown above, the thin arrows represent a probabilistic dependence of the parameter
(node) at the arrowhead on the node at the tail. Solid arrows represent a summation contribution
by the node at the tail to the node at the arrowhead. A box with an index in the upper left hand
corner represents a summation over all nodes within the box having that index. The green nodes
are optional so that the user can add an intercept term (0) and/or over dispersion terms (k, ) to the
Poission regression.

Parameters of the hierarchical model are assigned the distributions:
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This model describes a standard Bayesian Poission regression with possible intercept (0) and
over dispersion terms (k, ) which the user can include if the fit to the data warrants it. For readers
interested in the details of Bayesian Poission regression see references (Gelman A., 2013) and
(Gelman A.& Hill, 2006). The implementation of HBP follows the details given in those two
books. The result is the green curve fit to the histogram below. The curve represents f(z), the
denominator of Bayes’ theorem from which we will obtain the rest of the terms needed to
compute the posterior match/non-match probabilities.

Figure 5: Poisson Regression fitted onto the histogram
Estimates for 0 and f0 can be obtained by noting that in the region of z near zero (denoted
by the symbol {z ≈ 0}), the vast majority of the scores should be from the Null (“non-match”)
distribution. Efron calls this “central matching” (Efron B., 2010). Here the posterior for the Null
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is effectively 1.

.

Using a quadratic expansion for logarithm of f(z), this allows us to write

for the set {z ≈ 0}. In practice, the regression is carried out with respect to the centers
of the z-intervals comprising {z ≈ 0}, i.e

.

Once estimates of the regression coefficients (a, b and c) are obtained, estimates for the Null
mean, standard deviation and prior 0 are found by plugging the normal density into the equation
above, equating like terms and solving for the unknown parameters (Efron B., 2004; Efron B.,
2010).
For each draw from the joint posterior description obtains a value not only for f(z), but
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also f0(z) and 0. A figure showing the posterior probabilities with respect to the data used in this
study appears below:

Figure 6: Platt Score and Match Probability Score Curve
Likelihood ratio (LR) estimates along with estimated credibility intervals around them
can be easily extracted for any z (and thus raw similarity score) following theory laid out above
(Efron B., 2007). The reason is simple to understand. Consider the “odds-form” of Bayes’
theorem commonly encountered in the forensic science literature

where Hp represents the proposition that two sets of patterns were generated from the same
source and Hd represents the proposition that two sets of patterns were not generated from the
same source. The middle term is the likelihood ratio. For a particular comparison, let the z-score,
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z represent the evidence term E. Then with a little algebra and substitution of definitions, a
likelihood ratio estimate for z can be expressed as

where a circumflex denotes an estimate. Each draw from the joint posterior given in Figure 4
yields a (marginal) value for tdr(xk), fdr(xk), 1 −

0

and 0 and thus LR(xk). The sample mean of

the marginal is used to estimate the LR(xk). A Tippett plot showing the likelihood ratios
constructed from data in this study appears below in Figure 7:

Figure 7: Tippet Plot of LR in cases
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Closing Remarks
The purpose of using the R statistical computing environment program is for
transparency. Anyone interested can attempt to reproduce all of the results in this thesis. With
such reproducibility we make a statement of bringing the field of forensic toolmark analysis into
a movement where the methodology of collection, digitization, and analysis of the resulting
features are freely peer reviewable, falsifiable and reusable. As mentioned before, various works
that have been cited are very eager to show off their results and make conclusions based off said
results, but the process in order to calculate the Likelihood Ratio is not clearly explained. With
both the data and calculation being openly available a database can be formed. That is, with a
database, while the LR calculations are both calculated and analyzed, frequentist methods can
begin to be deployed in order to corroborate or refute the findings of the Bayesian LR. Also, with
an open database, the toolmark community can help shape how calculations are made so that the
calculations and subsequently the expressed opinions based off said findings can be objective.
The findings of this paper and research has shown that it is possible to code a free and
open source program in order to calculate the Likelihood Ratio, and that the results are that is
may be a viable option to use such types of software in order to make calculations on toolmarks.
As mentioned several times, the future requires more data to be obtained in order to hone the
calculation process. Then the community will then have to determine whether or not the
technique is viable, which by said time there will be enough data in order to begin implementing
frequentist methods in order to support or refute the use of Bayesian methods for toolmark
analysis.
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APPENDIX I-Derivation of Odd’s Form
Equation 2

Equation 3

Step One: Division of Equation 2 by Equation 3

Step Two: Keep the contents left of the equal sign, while preparing the denominator on the right side to
be inverted.
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APPENDIX I-Derivation of Odd’s Form (continued)
Step Three: With the contents right of the equal sign, invert the denominator for multiplication
(Multiplying by the reciprocal of the divisor)

Step Four: Simplifying by canceling like terms.

Step Five: Multiplication of the remaining terms.
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APPENDIX II-Likelihood Ratio Scales
(Aitken & Stoney, 1991)
Likelihood Ratio in Range of
1-33
33-100
100-330
330-1000
1000+

Evidence Strength
Weak
Fair
Good
Strong
Very Strong

Jeffrey’s Scale (Jeffrey, 1998)
LR
<1
1-3
3-10
10-30
30-100
>100

Verbal Equivalent
Evidence supports for Theory B
Evidence barely supports Theory A
Evidence substantially supports Theory A
Evidence strongly supports Theory A
Evidence very strongly supports Theory A
Evidence decisively supports Theory A

Kass-Raftery Scale (Kass & Raftery, 1995)
LR
<1
1-3
3-20
20-150
>150

Verbal Equivalent
Evidence supports Theory B
Evidence barely supports Theory A
Evidence positively supports Theory A
Evidence strongly supports Theory A
Evidence very strongly supports Theory A
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APPENDIX II-Likelihood Ratio Scales (continued)
Brent Ostrum
LR
>1-10
10-100
100-1,000
1,000-10,000
10,000-1,000,000
>1,000,000

Verbal Equivalent
Weak support for proposition
Moderate support
Moderately strong support
Strong support
Very strong support
Extremely strong support
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Appendix III-Algorithm Flow Chart Part One
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Appendix III- Algorithm Flow Chart Part Two (continued)

